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Abstract 
The world today is increasingly confronted with systemic threats and challenges, in 
which femtorisks—small-scale dangers that are inherent to system structures and 
function and which pose asymmetrically catastrophic risks—can build in consequence, 
spreading uncontrollably like epidemics in both natural and social systems in such 
diverse areas as ecology, epidemiology, finance, the Internet, terrorism, and 
international relations.  They have been successfully modeled in ecology in the context 
of complex adaptive systems: systems made up of individual agents, whose interactions 
have macroscopic consequences that feed back to influence individual behavior.  While 
acknowledging challenges, this paper argues for the value of applying to societal 
systems the approaches that natural scientists have developed in quantifying and 
modeling biological interactions and ecosystems. 
 iii
Acknowledgments 
The paper's authors attended a workshop in June 2011 at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) entitled Security in the Age of Systemic Risk.  This 
paper resulted from the presentations and discussions there. 
Workshop principal organizer Simon A. Levin is the Moffett Professor of Biology at 
Princeton University and the Director of the Center for BioComplexity in the Princeton 
Environmental Institute.  His principal research interests are in understanding how 
macroscopic patterns and processes are maintained at the level of ecosystems and the 
biosphere, and he has pioneered the application of those approaches to complexity to 
other disciplines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
Security in the age of Systemic Risk: Strategies, Tactics and Options for 
Dealing with Femtorisks and Beyond 
Frank, M. Goud Collins, M. Clegg, U. Dieckmann, V. Kremenyuk, A. Kryazhimskiy 
J. Linnerooth-Bayer, S. Levin, A. Lo, B. Ramalingam, J. Ramo, S. Roy, D. Saari, 
Z. Shtauber, K. Sigmund, J. Tepperman, S. Thurner, W. Yiwei, and D. von Winterfeldt 
 
The world today is increasingly confronted with systemic threats and challenges, in 
which femtorisks—small-scale dangers that are inherent to system structures and 
function and which pose asymmetrically catastrophic risks—can build in consequence, 
spreading uncontrollably like epidemics through global networks that permeate the 
international system. Such femtorisks are well known in a variety of contexts, and have 
been recognized in both natural and social systems in such diverse areas as ecology, 
epidemiology, finance, the Internet, terrorism, and international relations. Many of these 
risks can be characterized in the context of complex adaptive systems: systems made up 
of individual agents, whose interactions have macroscopic consequences that feed back 
to influence individual behavior (Axelrod 1997, Holland 1996, Levin 1999, Miller and 
Page 2007). In particular, small changes can produce and amplify systemic risks that, 
because of nonlinear effects and associated path dependencies, cause changes that can 
be totally or practically irreversible and carry consequences for decades or even 
centuries. Such risks can never be completely ironed out of systems and cannot be 
managed using simplistic approaches. These systems may contain multiple stable 
equilibria, or even no equilibria whatsoever, being subject to perpetual dynamic change 
(Epstein, 2007; Laver and Sergenti, 2011). Moreover, these risks themselves emerge as 
inevitable products of advances in areas that are generally socially and economically 
beneficial. Bioengineering, nanotechnologies, faster and more tightly coupled financial 
networks, better integrated and efficient infrastructure and a more interconnected 
network of international regulation and development projects—these are the 
simultaneous products of, and drivers towards, an increasingly globalized world.  They 
bring new opportunities to develop, manage and sustain open and prosperous societies, 
but their complexity also provides the seeds of catastrophe and collapse. 
  
 
Risk Analysis in an Increasingly Complex World 
Recent global events such as the financial crash of 2008 and the wave of upheavals in 
the Middle East that started in the spring of 2011 demonstrated the limitations of 
classical approaches and tools for measuring and managing risk and for recognizing and 
responding to systemic instability in international relations.  A variety of reasons have 
been advanced to explain why financial and international relations professionals were 
taken by surprise by these events, despite the resources and modeling that have gone 
into tracking and understanding financial and international political systems. Rapid 
changes in recent decades, including the introduction of new players and tools, have 
created increasingly complex and tightly interconnected systems, as networks of actors 
interact in new, sometimes unprecedented, ways.  Numerous analysts suggest that 
approaches which provide greater attention to networks and micro-level actions and 
interactions will be more likely to offer warnings of instability and can help guide the 
development of policies and regulatory strategies to prevent collapses and minimize 
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surprises (Urry, 2003; Frank, 2005; Klitgaard and Light, 2005; Harrison, 2006, Ramo, 
2009).  
Evolutionary and ecological theories offer useful metaphors to improve 
understanding and structure strategies for mitigating risk in financial and international 
relations systems, as well as other areas such as international development assistance 
and counterterrorism. The challenge remains, however, to translate conceptual insights 
that incorporate cultural and social features as elements of system complexity into 
models that can provide new insights and guidance on risk assessments and policy 
analysis.  
Traditional risk assessment tools and techniques depend on several structural 
assumptions about the composition of systems and the knowledge of the people acting 
within them.  They presume a thorough knowledge of the events in the system by the 
actors, and the independence, or predictable dependence, of events. These assumptions 
require a knowable and decomposable structure to the system.  The techniques often 
employ a ‘divide and conquer’ analytic strategy that assesses the system’s components 
and risks independently, with the expectation that they can be understood in isolation 
and aggregated into a coherent whole successfully. Recent events—such as increasing 
terrorism, the financial crisis of 2008, and the coupled earthquake-tsunami-Fukushima 
nuclear power plant failure– have challenged this conventional wisdom of risk analysis.  
These structural assumptions are further weakened by viewing agents as 
perfectly rational: a common assumption in the social science and risk management 
disciplines. These agent-level assumptions simultaneously shape expectations about the 
behavior of actors in complex systems and affect the ability of decision-makers to 
understand and regulate these systems. When these assumptions are relaxed, the 
representation of agents must transition from perfectly rational actors capable of making 
optimal decisions under the most challenging of circumstances to boundedly rational 
actors who seek just adequate solutions to problems through learning, adapting, and 
experimenting (Simon, 2000). The situation becomes even more difficult when 
interactions between actors are strategic, and each actor seeks to anticipate the choices 
of others—resulting in numerous contingencies based on their ability to coordinate, 
cooperate, compete, and communicate (Schelling, 1981). Thus, in the cases of terrorism, 
cybersecurity, and financial markets, the best options available to any actor are 
contingent on the perceptions and decisions of the others, suggesting a shift from 
decision theory to game theory (Tsebelis, 1989; Bezell et al., 2010; National Academy 
of Science, 2010). Moreover, actors often respond to psychological and emotional cues 
that are impossible to model and difficult to understand, but which lead them to make 
choices that can be seen as “irrational” from a classical perspective (Stavrakakis and 
Chrysoloras, 2006). 
 
Robustness and Systemic Risk in Complex Adaptive Systems 
In order to cope with the challenges of complexity, it is useful to draw analogies from 
biology, and in particular from the ways organisms have evolved in response to the 
challenge of uncertainty.  In any complex system, robustness or resilience depends upon 
the balance among three interrelated aspects (Levin, 1999): 
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The diversity of the units within the system, which encodes its adaptive capacity; 
The extent to which the system contains functional redundancies, providing insurance 
against the loss of key elements; 
The degree of modularity with respect to the coupling between components. 
Modularity or compartmentalization sets bounds on the contagious spread of destructive 
events, from epidemic outbreaks to bank crashes, and provides building blocks for 
recovery or novel advances. 
When taken as a whole, the trade-offs among these three features enable a 
system to keep functioning in the face of changes in its environment, and provide 
opportunities for experimentation to produce innovations without placing the entire 
system at risk (Simon, 1996). Indeed diversity and modularity have been key building 
blocks in the evolution of the biosphere, enabling the major transitions to 
multicellularity and beyond. Evolution depends on chance and choice, but choice by an 
unseeing filter rather than an active manager.  The contrast has been made clearest, 
perhaps, by Francois Jacob, who likened the evolutionary process to the work of a 
tinkerer (Jacob, 1977). In contrast, the rational actor model emphasizes planning and 
analysis at the expense of engagement, exposure, and learning opportunities, and 
thereby erodes a system’s adaptive capacity: less time engaging and exploring leads to 
fewer opportunities for learning.  
One of the most remarkable triumphs of evolution, the vertebrate immune 
system, provides an extremely suggestive model for how we might engineer systems to 
have the requisite robustness to withstand the shocks produced by femtorisks and to 
generally mitigate systemic risks. The key features of this model include: 
The maintenance of a set of generic defenses that can rapidly identify and 
respond to threats, (as the body does when it recognizes a pathogen and rushes 
generalized antibodies to the site of the threat); 
Persistent engagements that enable rapid learning through interaction with threatening 
actors or processes (as the body produces specialized antibodies in response to the 
invader); 
Translating lessons from prior experiences into customized, localized defenses 
against previously encountered threats (the body produces permanent defenses against 
the infection);  
The maintenance of an archive of previously experienced threats and the 
addition of successful countermeasures to the set of generic responses in order to 
mitigate future encounters rapidly (the body’s antibody repertoire). 
Many of the aspects of the immune system model have comparable features in 
international systems.  For example, studies of military innovation often emphasize the 
complexity of peacetime developments, when uncertainties proliferate due to a lack of 
engagement and the resulting need to maximize flexibility through the creation of 
generic capabilities that can be modified as new information about rivals’ goals, 
strategies, tactics, and technologies become available (Rosen, 1994; Murray and Millett, 
1998; Murray and Knox, 2001).  Likewise, foreign policy professionals often express 
concerns about nations cutting off ties with rogue states, arguing that severing 
diplomatic relations hinders experts’ perspective, insights, and strategic context, and 
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reduced interaction lessens influence and opportunities for change (Brzezinski, Gates, et 
al., 2004) – essentially freezing the evolution of specialized defenses, and destroying 
any opportunity for co-evolution of symbiotic systems. 
 
 
Weaknesses of Traditional Risk Management Analysis for Policy 
 
The adaptive model described above can offer an important alternative to more 
traditional risk management approaches. The limitations of the traditional approach are 
displayed in the context of decision-making under uncertainty and intelligence failure. 
Because decision-making within the international system is often decentralized and 
negotiated, policymakers make significant investments of their time, energy, and 
resources in efforts to forge a shared vision with others and agree on a course of action. 
The costs of reaching a consensus can be high, and are not easily undone. Those who 
support decision makers, such as intelligence professionals, policy analysts, and risk 
managers, face significant incentives to inform these negotiations with predictions about 
the future and the behavior of complex systems in order to convert uncertainty into risk. 
As a result, intelligence failures may occur for three reasons: 
 
Limits of prediction: The complexity of the system being examined may be 
sufficiently intricate that prediction is not analytically viable. In these cases, classical 
risk analysis tools may break down in their ability to assist analysts and decision makers 
understand the likelihood of specific events or their consequences (Betts, 2007). For 
example, the long-term consequences of alternative industrial policies on the global 
economy and climate system may be epistemologically unknowable. 
Inappropriate indicators: Analysts and decision makers may be improperly 
oriented, focusing their attention on the collection and analysis of information that does 
not capture the character of system risk or impending phase transitions or regime 
changes in complex systems. The surprises of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 or the 
recent Arab Spring uprisings provide examples where the mindsets of analysts and 
decision makers oriented them toward sets of indicators that pointed toward the long-
term stability of fragile governing regimes, while a different orientation might have 
identified alternative revolutionary trends (MacEachin, 2005; Davis, 2008). 
Policy and decision makers’ inertia: Analysts may correctly predict serious risks 
within the international system, but policymakers may be vested in preserving their 
hard-won political agreements and therefore ignore or reject information that doesn’t 
conform to their world views, resulting in peculiar producer-consumer dynamics 
(Hilsman, 1956; Kent, 1968; Betts, 2007; 2008; Treverton, 2008, Rovner, 2011). For 
example, senior decision makers within the US Department of Defense ignored 
numerous warnings from other departments, professional military officers, the 
intelligence community, and allies regarding the likely post-Saddam conditions in Iraq 
and brushed off concerns that the available US military forces were unprepared to 
secure the Iraqi population and borders after the fall of the regime. 
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Traditional risk assessment models encourage failures of these types by 
assuming that all possible outcomes can be identified and assigned probabilities of 
occurrence and estimates of their associated costs, and that such parameters are stable 
through time and across different economic and political conditions. This analytic 
process can strip systems of their complexity and deny the consideration of outcomes 
that may result from strategic interaction or novel innovations.  Traditional risk analysis 
is highly exploitative of known information, but limits the exploration for alternative 
views of the system. 
 
 
Limits of Prediction 
 
The first type of failure is grounded in conventional risk management and policy 
making paradigms that assume the behavior of systems are predictable, either with 
certainty or probabilistically.  This approach emphasizes the design of rational, utility 
maximizing policies and seeks improvements through the refinement of predictive 
models. An implicit assumption in such predictive efforts is that the world is a stable 
system and historical data can be used to infer the probabilistic structure of the future. 
 
By comparison, evolved systems cope with uncertainty by emphasizing 
engagement and increasing their rate of learning and feedback. Because evolutionary 
systems learn through exposure and interaction, the survival of their units is based on 
their capacity to respond to new discoveries, rather than their ability to predict the 
future. From the policy-making perspective, an over-commitment to planning places 
unrealistic burdens on analysts and decision makers to correctly predict the outcomes of 
alternative policy options, many of which are contingent on the choices of others, while 
denying opportunities for learning through engagement (Danzig, 2011). Failures to 
engage not only deprive analysts and decision makers of valuable experiences, but 
enable their mindsets to go unchallenged, exacerbating the second source of failure 
while limiting the options of policy makers.  At the same time systems have to retain the 
ability to ignore past experience when it is no longer applicable, and this presents an 
unusual challenge: the ability to rapidly shift modes to understand that a situation has 
not been seen before, and thus demands a different reaction. Thus, for instance, 
responses to terrorist problems or structural international relations problems like the rise 
of a new nation in a globalized world cannot be confronted with Cold War approaches 
that might, for instance, frame terrorism as “islamofascism” or treat China as a new 
USSR. 
 
A complex adaptive systems approach to international systems changes the 
emphasis of policy making for governance regimes. It also suggests the importance of 
new structural arrangements. Rather than base international development or security 
policies primarily or exclusively on analytic predictions, this alternative seeks to 
increase rates of interaction and learning through constant engagement and 
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experimentation.  The result is a policymaking framework that is increasingly robust, 
adaptive, and less vulnerable to surprise. 
 
 
Slow Variables as Indicators in Complex Systems 
 
The second type of failure results when systems are poorly understood, so that analysts 
and policy makers focus their attention on variables that neither accurately reflect the 
state of the system nor provide meaningful insights into its operations.  Improper 
orientation enables small systemic risks, which may be easy to mitigate early on, to 
grow into major problems and crises by the time they are identified.  Alternatively, 
continuous attention and resources may be devoted to monitoring and attempting to 
alter variables that possess little dynamism, while neglecting other variables that are 
considerably more dynamic, further increasing the opportunity costs of failed 
interventions and missed opportunities by expending resources on what cannot be 
changed while ignoring what can. This is particularly true for strategies that must 
interact with and shape global systems, and cannot rely on discrete “on/off” interactions 
and or employ “exit strategies” whenever contact between actors is persistent. 
 
An example of the need for persistent engagement, even in cases where systems 
appear stable and relatively unimportant, can be seen in the roots of ongoing financial 
crisis.  In 1998, Commodities and Futures Trading Commission Chairman Brooksley 
Born warned of systemic risks resulting from Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and other 
derivatives securities.  However, at the time these markets were relatively small, stable, 
and liquid.  Thus, her warning was overruled by Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers. At 
that time, the aggregate notional exposure of the CDS market in 1998 was $180 billion, 
a small fraction of the financial industry’s total assets. Thus, regulators believed that 
intervention into the market was unnecessary.  However, the growth of the CDS market 
went unacknowledged, and it totaled $6 trillion in 2004, and $58 trillion in 2007.  As a 
result, market volatility that was regarded as unimportant a decade earlier brought down 
AIG, one of the largest and most respected insurance companies in the world.  The 
nature of the regulatory mechanisms as either “on” or “off” meant that regulators and 
traders failed to notice or adapt to the changing circumstances of the market, the capital 
devoted to it, and the characteristics of its dynamics and volatility.  Thus systemic risks 
proliferated and ultimately crashed the industry. 
 
Complex adaptive systems contain evolving networks, the properties of which 
fluctuate on varying temporal and spatial scales. Fast-changing variables, generally easy 
to identify, pose one set of challenges to policymakers, but a different set of issues 
arises from the characteristics that change in slower and less obvious ways. These 
changes may be difficult to perceive, but subtle changes in some ‘slow variables’ can 
portend major transitions, and may provide policymakers with means to identify and 
engage systemic risks before crises ensue. Determining and measuring these 'slow 
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variables’, which develop and change as a result of the self-organization of the system 
rather than an outcome of foresight and planning, may define the epistemological 
limitations of what can be forecast about an international system.  
 
If slow variables can be identified and trends reliably observed, these new 
indicators may be adapted to conventional risk and planning approaches. They may 
enable new conceptual frameworks that orient analysts and decision makers in ways 
better suited towards managing and mitigating the complexity of contemporary and 
emerging threats. Without some ‘slow variables’ to capture these trends, policymakers 
and analysts operating in a complex system must emphasize an adaptive decision 
making model that regularly checks outcomes and revises policies in order to adapt to 
unforeseen consequences of more familiar planning paradigms. 
 
Slow variables may also be useful in the design of feedback mechanisms for 
providing actors with situational awareness. This challenge is evident with regard to 
financial markets, where those engaged in the riskiest behaviors are able to offload the 
negative consequences of their decisions onto others. In doing so, normal feedback 
channels that warn actors when they are engaging in dangerous behaviors may break 
down, decreasing the awareness of agents whose choices are the largest sources of 
systemic risk. For example, the collapse of the real-estate market in the US resulted 
from the combination of rising home prices, low interest rates, and access to large 
amounts of credit. Under normal conditions, analysts would regard each of these factors 
as contributing to financial stability. However, no systemic feedback mechanism existed 
to let lenders, borrowers, and regulators know that these three drivers had combined to 
create an increasingly unstable and unsustainable state (Khandani, Lo, and Merton, 
2009). The lack of feedback in the system, e.g. a ‘slow variable’ constructed to indicate 
the extent that investors were leveraging their resources, meant that regulators and 
traders had significantly underestimated the potential risk and magnitude of losses in the 
system. When prices fell, the result was a global crash. 
 
 
Complex Adaptive Systems Analysis to Overcome Policy  
and Decision Makers’ Inertia 
 
The third source of failure in traditional risk analysis provides a window into the 
relationship between producers and consumers of analysis. This relationship has 
repeatedly undermined the assumptions of rational action inherent in traditional risk 
assessments or the belief that states are unified actors that rationally pursue their 
national interests. In their producer-consumer relationship, policymakers and the 
analysts who support them confront problems differently, based on their distinct 
responsibilities and roles in decision making processes. Analysts focus on the 
substantive aspects of a system, whether financial markets, protecting critical 
infrastructure, or sponsoring and executing international development projects. By 
contrast, decision makers must consider a wider range of concerns, but possess a 
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narrower organizational or even personal set of interests, compelling them to focus on 
the types of actions that they and other stakeholders can agree upon, or that can be 
imposed given their relative power. Because decision makers are involved in a political 
process, as opposed to a technical engineering or design process, they are often reluctant 
to change policies, particularly if the costs of doing so would open hard fought 
decisions to renegotiation. As a result, decision makers can become vested in particular 
solutions, and resource commitments can get locked in, diminishing the adaptive 
capacity of the actors in the system. Once committed, decision makers often neglect 
new information that might indicate that their policies were failing, or ignore the 
analysis of specialists that contradicts their expectations.  This willful blindness can 
allow the harmful effects of small risks to proliferate, diffuse, and amplify. 
 
Moreover, conflicts of interest can compromise the effectiveness of regulatory 
oversight.  For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve was designed to be the lender of last 
resort in the face of systemic liquidity shocks.  However, the Fed also sets interest rates 
so as to encourage lending and economic growth, which can enhance the likelihood of 
asset bubbles and systemic risk. Balancing these conflicting roles would be challenging 
even under a best-case scenario, and becomes virtually impossible to do properly during 
periods of financial distress and market instability. This conflict would be tantamount to 
mandating the Food and Drug Administration to sell diet pills, or licensing the 
Environmental Protection Agency to run helicopter tours through the Grand Canyon. 
 
As the challenges facing policy makers have become increasingly more 
complex, the traditional risk assessment paradigm is breaking down, exposing how 
assumptions of rationality and predictability are limiting the ability of policy makers to 
cope with the most difficult and pressing of problems in the international system. Given 
these deficiencies, the biologically based conceptual framework of complex adaptive 
systems seems even more attractive, emphasizing engagement, learning, and adaptation 
over the more traditional approach that overemphasized prediction and planning.  
 
 
Complexity to Enrich the Policy Framework 
 
Emphasizing robustness and adaptiveness can reveal weaknesses in the 
conceptualizations of the actors in international systems. For example, despite the 
global diversity of systems of governance and types of regimes, the institutions that 
manage risk in the international systems have largely divided the world’s governments 
into two categories: democratic or authoritarian. This labeling scheme, however, 
obscures more than it reveals, limiting the ability of decision makers to measure the 
similarities and differences between actors. Developing a new set of concepts for 
identifying and measuring similarity and difference among governments would assist in 
characterizing the diversity, and therefore the robustness, of the international system.    
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The dynamics of complex systems are particularly important for providing a 
new set of concepts for thinking about international affairs. Whereas traditional theories 
of international relations emphasized the balance of power between the system’s most 
powerful states, new concepts place a greater emphasis on dynamics rather than 
equilibrium. For example, analyses of international relations privilege relations between 
elites and official state institutions, yet non-state actors—whether international 
corporations that manage global capital flows, nongovernmental organizations 
promoting environmental and social responsibility, or terrorist groups committing acts 
of violence—play an increasingly prominent and dynamic role in creating and 
mitigating systemic risks. The complexity of the networks engenders complexity of 
interactions, and these interactions can include elements of contagion and diffusion 
processes, synchrony, hysteresis, and phase transitions between multiple equilibria, or 
even the possibility of non-equilibrium systems.  
 
The relationship between the dynamics of international systems and the decision 
making capabilities of the actors within them provides contrast between two competing 
perspectives of systemic risk. International relations theorists and practitioners have 
often worried about contagions that may diffuse throughout the system, e.g. the ‘domino 
theory’ that postulated the spread of communism, or regional arms races that might 
result from the development of weapons of mass destruction. Alternatively, there are 
also ‘trap doors’ in which several risks self-organize and occur simultaneously. These 
trap door dynamics may occur in financial crises, where once the norm and stigma of 
defaulting is removed by the first actor to default, others may rush to be the ‘second,’ 
resulting in a correlated, simultaneous action.  
 
The difference between falling dominoes and trap doors, however, is a matter of 
scale and the adaptive capacity of risk managers to intervene. As long as decision 
making cycles are slow, predicated on the classical predictive model, then policymakers 
will possess limited means for identifying risks, altering their behavior, and developing 
countermeasures quickly.  As a result, more and more threats may be experienced as 
synchronized trap doors. By comparison, when policymakers who are engaged in a 
problem can detect changes in the system’s dynamics, and possess the ability to act 
quickly, even if imperfectly, their opportunities for action will expand, and risks to the 
system’s stability will be seen more as a contagion.  Such a situation, while difficult to 
contain, may nevertheless be mitigated by a series of quick, adaptive interventions. 
 
Another topic of importance is the way relationships between actors transition 
from mutualism to parasitism or predation. Trends in the international system indicate 
that previously held balances between actors of different types change over time, and as 
a result, the costs and benefits of particular relationships have shifted. In the case of 
national and global economics, the percentage of national wealth devoted to financial 
services has steadily grown, exceeding the resources devoted to other sectors. Likewise, 
an important trend in the area of economic development has been the proliferation of 
donor organizations, each with its own agenda and processes that overwhelm the 
managerial capacity of recipients. In each case, relationships designed to add liquidity, 
transparency, or accountability to an international system evolve in a way that reduces, 
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not increases, the effectiveness of the markets and development projects in which they 
invest.  What began as positive developments ceases to be mutually beneficial for the 
parties involved.  
 
 
Complex Systems, Complex Insights 
 
Coping with systemic risks in the international system often involves addressing 
‘wicked problems’ where complex tradeoffs exist and solutions to one source of risk 
introduce or exacerbate other risks. One example of this tradeoff concerns information 
and transparency, and how to determine the balance between what information should 
be public vs. private. The specific details of individual cases dictate different 
considerations. For example, does an organization such as Wikileaks benefit the public 
good by exposing government secrets, or does it complicate the ability of diplomats to 
gather necessary information and speak frankly with their counterparts by subjecting all 
of their actions to public scrutiny? Does it matter if government secrets reveal that 
internal communications and private diplomatic efforts are consistent with its public 
statements and motives? Likewise, if studies of prospective vulnerabilities in critical 
infrastructure or financial markets identify exploitable weaknesses, should the results be 
publically disseminated, and if so, when and how? 
 
Ethical issues are also sources of complexity in the international system, 
constituting one of the slow variables noted earlier. Customs, norms and laws establish 
what behaviors or decisions are permissible or prohibited; these vary over time and 
geography, providing sources of non-linear change in the international system. 
Examinations of financial markets noted that significant social stigmas exist regarding 
the prospects of defaulting on debts, both for corporations and sovereign states. The 
prospect for a global financial collapse would be greatly increased if this norm ceased to 
hold. Likewise, one of the contributing factors to the Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt, 
was the combination of sustained contacts between the US and Egyptian military 
officers and the prosecution of war criminals for genocide in the Balkans. The 
combination of professionalization and concern about precedents criminalizing the use 
of the military force against civilians served to restrain the use of widespread violence 
in the service of prolonging the Mubarak regime. Finally, a norm that has significantly 
affected the structure and dynamics of the international system has been the non-first-
use of nuclear weapons—a norm that has survived the challenge of proliferation for 
almost seven decades, yet is by no means assured to continue.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The outlines of a new approach to assessing systemic risk for complex adaptive systems 
in international relations, where agents were boundedly rational and engaged in strategic 
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interaction under uncertainty, appears to offer opportunities for new insights and 
analytic frameworks. This approach shifts the evaluative criteria of policy options away 
from optimal, often brittle solutions that require accurate predictions, in favor of robust 
solutions that can adapt in response to new information and experiences, modeled on 
successful approaches in natural sciences. 
 
In several ways, this biological approach already builds on successful practices 
in risk assessment that mimic evolutionary processes.  Risk analysis rarely can identify 
optimal policies, but it can eliminate the least appealing options from consideration, 
helping decision makers understand the features or properties of strategies that are likely 
to fail. This selection process is similar to natural selection in biology, where those 
members of a population with the lowest fitness are the most likely to be replaced. A 
second common feature of successful risk management strategies and biological 
systems is the importance of building on solutions or capabilities with multiple benefits.  
For example, improved border security provides benefits to counterterrorism, 
counternarcotics, and curbing illegal immigration. Just as in biology, successful risk 
mitigation strategies may be generic, allowing for their reuse in multiple domains or for 
many purposes. 
 
Evolutionary examples provide promising models for coping with risks, 
particularly because of their ability to cope with uncertainty and relax the rationality 
assumptions embedded in more traditional analytic approaches. However, important 
differences remain between social systems and biological ones. In biological evolution, 
adaptation occurs as a result of random search, building upon designs that worked in the 
past. By comparison, adaptation in social systems is not purely the result of random 
search. Instead, the search for new solutions to challenges is based on the combination 
of interests, ethical prescriptions, and strategic anticipation. While we advocate the need 
for an evolutionary model that emphasizes adaptability and robustness as opposed to 
predictability and optimality, the evolutionary dynamics of the international system may 
differ from those observed in biological systems due to  fundamental differences in their 
search processes. 
 
The appealing conceptual framework of complex adaptive systems for 
understanding and containing risks presents a challenge in terms of constructing 
quantitative and computational models that will offer more detailed insights into the 
characteristics of a complex international system. A complex adaptive systems approach 
to international risk management and international relations offers new ways to 
understand evolving patterns of governance and relationships between regional 
constituencies, and the interactions between elites and broader, grass-roots actors in the 
development, maintenance, and transformation of governing regimes. New femtorisks 
will evolve, as different cultures, economies, and ecological imperatives create new 
frictions in new configurations. With humility and openness, a new forum to examine 
these approaches to complex problems might spawn the conversations and community 
required to gather lessons from the broad experience of this new network, and deploy 
that experience to help to understand and solve networked problems. 
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